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AMEND THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL
AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 (SMCRA)
Robert E. Beck*
INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act' (SMCRA) in 1977 to provide environmental controls on
both surface mining and underground mining for coal and to
provide for reclamation of the land after the mining process was
over. Notwithstanding the explicit federalism 2 of environmental
legislation of the time, such as the Clean Air Act of 19703 and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 4 it
was immediately clear that SMCRA would require a greater degree of state-level administration. As the statute reads:
[B]ecause of the diversity in terrain, climate, biology, chemical,
and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing,
authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations subject to this Act should rest
with the States."5
Thus the approach favoring state administration was intended to
be pragmatic rather than philosophical. However, controversy
arose almost immediately about the primacy a state would have
6
once it had taken over the administration of the program.
The first controversy arose over the scope of the Secretary of

* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 12011328 (1994)).
2. See generally Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism: Historical
Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1705 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017671'(q) (1994)).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1994)).
5. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1994).
6. The Secretary of the Interior's approval would be given pursuant to the criteria contained in section 503 of SMCRA. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 1253.
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the Interior's 7 authority to promulgate substantive regulations
that expand or flesh-out the specific requirements in SMCRA.8
The reasoning of the challenge was that the more the Secretary
could do by substantive regulation, the less there would be for a
state to do once it assumed administration of SMCRA. 9 In an en
banc decision, with four judges dissenting, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the Secretary's authority to promulgate substantive regulations. 10 Subsequent controversies have thus involved the federal/state relationship within the context of the
Secretary's established rule-making authority."
One such major controversy arose from federal nonrecognition of waivers that surface owners had given to mineral owners
at the time that the mineral estate was severed from the surface
estate.12 Surface owners waived the right to subjacent support3

7. In section 201(a) of SMCRA, Congress created the Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (commonly abbreviated
OSM) within the Department of the Interior. SMCRA assigns the duty
of implementing the Act to "the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior], acting through the Office." See 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c).
8. At the same time several states and/or mining associations
challenged the constitutionality of SMCRA as beyond federal power
and/or an undue encroachment on state powers. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). These cases are discussed in Robert E. Beck,
Setting the Course for the Surface Mining Control and. Reclamation Act of
1977, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 24, 25-28 [hereinafter
Beck, Setting the Course].
9. See Judge Tamm's dissent in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514, 532-34 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
10. 653 F.2d at 523. The case is discussed in Beck, Setting the Course,
supra note 8, at 24, 28, 74-75.
11. Over the years numerous regulations have been challenged by
both the industry, arguing that the specific regulation is not within the
scope of the Secretary's authority, and environmental groups, arguing
that the Secretary should have regulated where the Secretary did not
regulate or should have regulated more stringently than the Secretary
did. For an introduction to the broad range of challenges, see generally the district court opinions in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14 Env't Rep. Cas.(BNA) 1083 (D.D.C. 1980); 19 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1477 (D.D.C. 1980); 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1724
(D.D.C. 1984).
12. See 30 C.F.R § 817.124 (1979) and the Secretary's comments
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and any liability on the mineral owner's part for surface subsidence damages due to development of the mineral. 14 While the
mining industry recognized that SMCRA prohibited subsidence
15
where it was technologically and economically feasible to do so,'

it argued that the Secretary did not have authority to require the
repair or restoration of the land and structures damaged where
subsidence was not to be prevented.1 6 In particular, the industry
objected to such a requirement when mine operators were the
beneficiaries of waivers recognized under state law absolving
7
them of the common law duty to provide subjacent support.1
After losing this argument before Secretary of the Interior Andrus in the Carter administration, 8 and in court, 9 they were successful in convincing Secretary Watt in the Reagan administration to meet them part way.20 Secretary Watt maintained the
requirement that the surface lands be restored or the damage
compensated for, but required restoration or compensation for
2
damaged surface structures only if state law required it. ' Of

course, in situations where waivers existed, state law would not
require restoration or compensation.
After the Watt approach was sustained by the D.C. Court of
Appeals in 1991,22 Congress intervened in the Energy Policy Act

about the section at promulgation, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,275 (1979).
13. Under the common law, the surface owner had an absolute
right to subjacent support from the mineral estate. See Wilms v. Jess, 94

Ill. 464 (1880).
14. See Robert E. Beck & Sharon Sigwerth, Illinois Coal Mine Subsidence Law, 29 DEPAuL L. REv. 383, 396-403 (1980) (stating that the surface owner can waive the right to support with express words of waiver
or by necessary implication from the language used).
15. Except where planned subsidence is required. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 1266(b)(1) (1994).
16. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 459 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 E2d 694, 739-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
17. See sources cited supra note 12.
18. See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,422 (1979).

19. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1088.
20. See 48 Fed. Reg. 24,638 (1983).
21. See id.
22. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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of 199223 and amended SMCRA to require mine permittees to
"promptly repair, or compensate for, material damage resulting
from subsidence caused to any occupied residential dwelling and
structures related thereto, or non-commercial building due to
underground coal mining operations." 24 This amendment does
not cover commercial structures, but in the proposed regulations
for implementing the amendment, 25 OSM included a requirement that commercial structures be repaired as well: essentially a
return to the Carter administration regulations. However, when
the final regulations implementing the 1992 amendment were
promulgated in 1995, the provision for commercial structures
was omitted. 26
A second highly controversial promulgated regulation was the
Applicant Violator System (AVS), applicable to both the SMCRA
permit application and enforcement processes. Basically, SMCRA
requires the denial of a coal mining permit to an applicant who
owns or controls a coal mining operation that is already in violation of SMCRA or other relevant environmental laws. 27 In light
of the rising number of mining companies with operations in
different states - or with operations under different names
within individual states - pursuing implementation of this provision on a national level seemed particularly appealing to environmental groups and groups of affected citizens. Thus the motivation for the Secretary to act appears to have come from these
groups rather than from the Secretary himself.u Implementation

23. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24. 30 U.S.C. § 1309a(a)(1).
25. 58 Fed. Reg. 50,181 (1993) (proposed § 817.121(c)(3)).
26. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,722 (1995).
27. See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c).
Where the schedule or other information available to the
regulatory authority indicates that any surface coal mining
operation owned or controlled by the applicant is currently
in violation of this Act or such other laws referred to this
subsection, the permit shall not be issued until the applicant
submits proof that such violation has been corrected or is in
the process of being corrected to the satisfaction of the regulatory authority, department, or agency which has jurisdiction over such violation ....
Id.
28. See Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Clark, 22 Env't Rep.
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has involved an unceasing sixteen year battle. 29 The most recent
salvo was the January 31, 1997 decision of the D.C. Circuit throwing out the Secretary's regulations defining "ownership and
control."3 0
The most substantial and persistent major controversy, however, is the issue of federal oversight of state implementation
once the regulations have been promulgated and the states have
achieved primacy.3 1 The current posture of that controversy is
the focus of this paper: particularly the effort in Congress to
amend SMCRA to limit federal oversight after state primacy is
achieved. However, the proposed amendments go far beyond
that immediate controversy. To understand that controversy and
the proposed changes, it is necessary first to describe the basic
enforcement scheme provided for in SMCRA.
I.

SMCRA's BASIc ENFORCEMENT SCHEME

SMCRA provides that if a state "wishes to assume exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations," it must submit its program to the Secretary
for approval. 32 Moreover, this "exclusive" jurisdiction is subject to
the limitations in section 521.33

Cas. (BNA) 1217 (D.D.C. 1985) (amended decree).
29. For a synopsis of the history of the litigation, see Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Lujan, 963 F.2d 1541, 1544-46 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (holding that the district court that had acted did not have jurisdiction over the matter and remanded for dismissal).
30. National Mining Ass'n v. Interior Dep't, 43 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1961 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reversing the federal district court which
had granted summary judgment for the government). The overturned
regulations were issued at 30 C.F.R. pt. 773 (1988); 30 C.F.R.
§ 778.13(b) (1989); and 30 C.F.R. pts. 773, 843 (1989). For the precise
language of the statute, see supra note 27.
31. This controversy is discussed at length and in detail in Robert
E. Beck, The FederalRole Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA) on Nonfederal Lands After State Primacy, 31 TULSA

L.J 677 (1996) [hereinafter Beck, Federal Role].
32. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a). Such approvals have been subjected to judicial review. See, e.g., Illinois S. Project, Inc. v. Hodel, 844 F.2d 1286
(7th Cir. 1988); Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Watt, 562 E Supp.
741 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
33. 30 U.S.C. §' 1253(a).
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Under section 521, the Secretary clearly may intervene in enforcement after state primacy is achieved in two different circumstances. First, if, based on any federal inspection, the Secretary34
determines that there is any "condition, practice, or violation
that creates an imminent danger to the health or safety of the
public, or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, air, or water resources" hereinafter imminent danger and significant harm, the
Secretary must intervene with a cessation order [CO] and if necessary "impose affirmative obligations." 35 Second, the Secretary
clearly has authority to assume federal administration of the
whole or a part of a state program if the Secretary follows the
formal procedures specified in SMCRA and concludes that violations of SMCRA are resulting "from a failure of the State to enforce such State program or any part thereof effectively."36
What led to controversy was the provision of section 521 providing that if the inspector finds a violation of SMCRA or any
permit condition required by SMCRA in a situation where there
is no imminent danger or significant harm involved, the Secretary "shall issue a notice to the permittee . . .fixing a reasonable

time ... for the abatement of the violation .... "37 The basic argument is over whether this provision applies during periods of
state primacy or applies only during periods of nonstate primacy.38 Although the Secretary has often hedged the exercise of
this authority with procedural limitations, 39 the Secretary 4° has
generally assumed the authority to intervene by issuing a notice
of violation (NOV) directly to the alleged violator even during

state primacy.41 Under a second controversial provision in section
34. Generally the reference to Secretary includes as here "or his
authorized representative." See, e.g., § 1271.
35. § 1271(a) (2).
36. § 1271(b).
37. § 1271(a) (3).
38. Of course, it would apply to federal lands not under state
primacy.
39. The first procedural limitation was the 1988 regulatory initiative. See Beck, Federal Role, supra note 31, at 708, 713-18. The second was
the 1995 policy change initiative. See id. at 718-24.
40. Generally, from Secretary Andrus forward.
41. The Secretary's position was upheld, largely on procedural and
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521, the Secretary has authority to suspend or revoke the mining
permit of a permittee if, in addition to other preconditions, a
specified federal inspection of the permittee reveals a "pattern of
42
violations."
Except for the approach under which the federal government
formally assumes administration of a state program, 43 the other
oversight intervention approaches precondition federal action on
a federal inspection. It thus becomes important to identify when
federal inspections can be conducted under SMCRA after state
primacy is achieved and which ones serve as preconditions in
given SMCRA intervention provisions. Section 517 provides for
the -federal inspections necessary to evaluate state administration
of approved state programs. 44 These inspections can serve as a
basis for federal COs where there is imminent danger or threat
of significant harm45 as can any other federal inspection. However, these inspections do not serve as a basis for either of the
two controversial intervention provisions.
Section 521(a) (1) also provides that when, based on any information available to him, the Secretary believes that any person is
in violation of SMCRA or any permit condition in a permit issued pursuant to SMCRA, the Secretary is to notify the state regulatory authority.46 If the state fails to take appropriate action
within 10 days, 47 the Secretary "shall immediately order federal
inspection." ' However, SMCRA is silent as to what is to happen
if the federal inspection finds that a violation of SMCRA exists
which does not involve an imminent danger of significant harm.
It can be argued that Congress must have intended the Secretary
limitations grounds, in National Coal Ass'n v. InteriorDep't 70 F.3d 1345
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (4).
43. See supra text accompanying note 36.
44. See 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
46. See 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (1).
47. Thus the abbreviation TDN for this procedure, to signify ten
day notice.
48. Id. However, the TDN is waived if a person informing the Secretary about the alleged violation provides adequate proof that an imminent danger of significant environmental harm exists and that the
state has failed to act. See id.
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to intervene if the state failed to do so; otherwise, why require
the Secretary to inspect?49 The Secretary justified the regulation
that provided for issuing NOVs directly to the permittee essentially on the basis that it "fills a void or gap in the Federal enforcement scheme ....- 50
However, each of the two controversial intervention provisions
contains a list of five inspections which does not include section
521(a)(1) inspections. These listing and failure to list combinations make the use of a section 521(a)(1) inspection a dubious
basis for the interventions here under discussion. Furthermore,
four of these five listed inspections do not form any basis for allowing the Secretary to intervene during state primacy. 51 However, in addition to those four inspections, the two controversial
intervention provisions refer to "federal inspection pursuant to
. . . section 504(b)."52 Section 504(b) provides that:
In the event that a State has a State program for surface coal
mining, and is not enforcing any part of such program, the
Secretary may provide for the Federal enforcement, under the
provisions of section 521 ... of that part of the State program
53
not being enforced by such State.

49. The only other argument would be that this becomes one
piece of evidence for the Secretary to rely on ultimately in a formal
proceeding to assume administration of all or part of a state program.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
50. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,302 (1979).
51. These four are: (1) federal inspection carried out during enforcement of a federal program in a state; (2) federal inspection carried out during enforcement of a federal lands program; (3) federal inspection pursuant to section 502 which covers the initial regulatory
period before state primacy; and (4) federal inspection during enforcement of a state program after there has been formal assumption of
such enforcement. See 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a). In the first three circumstances, state primacy does not exist. In the fourth circumstance state
primacy has been superseded through the formal process established in
section 521(b). See § 1271(b).
52. Except with respect to the pattern of violations section, the reference is to section 504 rather than section 504(b). See § 1271(a)(4).
However, section 504(b) would be the operative part of section 504 anyway. See § 1254(b).
53. § 1254(b).
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Thus, section 504(b) provides for federal enforcement pursuant
to section 521 in which the two controversial intervention provisions appear. The general precondition for enforcement under
those two provisions is the state's failure to enforce a part of its
program. There is no further precondition in section 504(b) of a
pattern of enforcement failure on the part of the state.
Consequently, reading sections 504(b) and 521 together indicates that if OSM finds a violation by a permittee that the state is
not addressing, then this constitutes a failure of the state to enforce a part of its program. The court in Annaco, Inc. v. Hodel5
relied specifically on section 504(b) to justify federal intervention
under the NOV provision.55 Thus based on either section 504(b)
or the state's failure to intervene or satisfactorily explain its nonintervention when the state receives the TDN, or both, the Secretary can proceed with issuing an NOV directly to the permittee
during state primacy.
II. THE EFFORT IN CONGRESS TO AMEND SMCRA TO LIMIT
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AFTER STATE PRIMACY

House Bill 237256 was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1995 under the primary sponsorship of Representative
Cubin of Wyoming. 57 Its almost identical counterpart in the
Senate, Senate Bill 1401, 59 was introduced under the primary
sponsorship of Senator Bennett of Utah.6° Of the dozen substantive changes House Bill 2372 would make in SMCRA, all but one
of them are directly related to the federal enforcement role in

54. 675 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Ky. 1987). For a discussion of the SMCRA cases, including those taking a position contrary to Annaco, Inc.,
see Beck, Federal Role, supra note 31, at 710-18.
55. See 675 F. Supp. at 1058.
56. H.R 2372, 104th Cong. (1995).
57. Also named as sponsors are 11 other representatives from Arizona, California, Colorado, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. See U.S. Coal Production -July 1997, COAL Wy-, Sept. 1, 1997, at 6.
Wyoming is now the leading state in production of coal in the United

States. See id.
58. See infra note 1 for a discussion of the only difference.
59. S. 1401, 104th Cong. (1995).
60. Also named as sponsors are 4 other senators from Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See id.
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primacy States.6 ' It appears that the principal purpose of the bill
is to eliminate the Secretary's authority to intervene directly
against a mine operator except in the imminent danger or significant harm situation 62 or after formal assumption of enforcement
of part or all of a state program. 63 However, because of other
proposed amendments relating to state primacy, the discussion
of House Bill 2372 will focus on the following four topics: (1)
the Secretary's direct role in enforcement of SMCRA after primacy; (2) enforcement of the Clean Water Act as applied to mining operations; (3) judicial review under SMCRA, and (4) the
statute of limitations for SMCRA enforcement.
A.

The Secretary's Direct Role in Enforcement of
SMCRA after Primacy
The philosophy for limiting the Secretary's direct enforcement
role after state primacy is achieved is expressed in two proposed
subsections to be added to the findings section of SMCRA. They
provide:
(1) a majority of the coal-producing States have developed programs that regulate surface and underground coal mining operations within their borders in an environmentally sound manner, taking into account the diversity in terrain, climate,
chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations; and
(m) duplication in regulatory programs should be avoided and
States assume the exclusive responsibility under approved State
programs for permitting and enforcement of the provisions of
this Act with respect to surface coal mining and reclamation

61. The unrelated amendment is section 10 of House Bill 2372
which would change the definition of surface coal mine operations in
section 701(28)(B) of SMCRA by adding a provision to exclude construction, improvement, or use of roads that (1) are designated public
roads under state law or are maintained under the authority of a governmental entity; (2) are constructed in a manner similar to other
roads of the same classification in that jurisdiction; and (3) are open to
public use. It is this author's interpretation that (3) is a separate criteria, although the Senate bill is less clear on this issue, being the only
instance in which the later Senate bill language does not track the
House bill language. Compare H.R. 2372 § 10 with S. 1401 § 10.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
63. See supra text accompanying note 36.

1997]

THE CURRENT EFFORT IN CONGRESS

0

operations within the States.64

The major fallacy in the proposed amendments is apparent on
the face of the above justifications. In (1) above, the proposed
subsection states that "a majority of the coal-producing States
have developed programs." The obvious problem is two-fold.
First, not all the coal-producing states have developed such programs. Second, having a program is of no value unless it is enforced. The findings say nothing of enforcement by the states. At
the time Congress passed SMCRA in 1977, it was known that a
number of states had fairly comprehensive reclamation statutes
on their books. Congress made clear its concern with (1) those
states that did not have such legislation, and (2) the at-bestspotty enforcement of the statutes in many of those states that
did have good legislation, which led to a lack of uniformity and
the possibility of industrial blackmail. 65 Undoubtedly many coal
mining states now have better environmental control and reclamation laws and regulations to deal with coal mining than they
had in 1977. It is certainly arguable that some of the states enacted those laws and promulgated those regulations in a desire
to take over administration of the federal law.
Furthermore, if the states are doing a credible job of enforcement as well,66 it needs to be asked whether that is because of a
desire to do so or because the Secretary is looking over the
state's shoulder, ready to intervene if the state does not enforce
its program. The economic pressures that existed in the early
1970's on a competitive coal mining industry may have changed,
but in many instances the change has been for the worse, 67 so
the assumption that a given state would continue rigorous enforcement after removal of stringent federal oversight is suspect.

64. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 2(3) (1995).
65. See generally, Morris K Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 553,
553-54 (1979).
66. See infra text accompanying note 69 (quoting OSM Acting Director Henry).
67. The Clean Air Act amendments in 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651(a)7651(o), will have a considerable adverse impact on the coal mining industry in the interior coal mining region. See Robert E. Beck, Survey of
Illinois Law: Natural Resources, 18 S. ILL. U. LJ. 927, 934 (1994) (noting a
prediction of a 17% decline in purchases of Illinois coal as a result of
the 1995 deadline and growing to a 38 % decline when the year 2000
deadline is met).
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There is recent evidence that states are still making efforts to
give their coal mining industries an unfair advantage over those
6
in other states. 1
Looking at the duality argument, it must be pointed out that a
system in which the federal government seeks enforcement if the
state fails to do so is not a duplicative effort; it is a complementary effort. In a recent review of OSM operations, Acting Director Henry noted that,
[F]or the evaluation years of 1993, 1994, and 1995, an average
of twenty-three federal Notices of Violation (NOVs) were issued
for on-the-ground violations during federal oversight inspections compared to an annual average of over 7,700 NOVs
is69
sued by state regulatory authorities for the same period."
These statistics - and there is no apparent reason to question
them - suggest that any arguments about officious meddling with
state programs by OSM are trivial. Perhaps there is indeed another agenda present in the proposed legislation.
The proposed substantive amendments that reduce the Secretary's role after state primacy is achieved do so by (1) removing
or changing the language in SMCRA establishing the Secretary's
authority, and (2) enacting specific limitations on that authority.
There is, however, some apparent inconsistency in the language
used in the proposed amendments and other instances of lack of
clarity.
As can be seen in the discussion in Part I of this article, section 504(b) of SMCRA provided one of two bases for determining that the Secretary has authority to act directly against an operator even though the state has primacy.70 The proposed
amendments would strike reference to section 504 in several subsections that grant the Secretary specific intervention authority.
Thus the reference to section 504(b) in section 521(a) (3), the
68. States are still seeking actively to support their coal mining industries in the competition with similar industries in other states. See
Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh, 888 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Ind. 1995), affd,
72 F3d 556 (7th Cir. 1995) (striking down a recent Indiana statute as
violative of the negative commerce clause); Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd sub .nom. Alliance for
Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995) (striking down a recent Illinois statute as violative of the negative commerce clause).
69. Kathrine L. Henry, Coal Mining in the United States: SMCRA's
Successful Blueprint, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 1997, at 7, 8.
70. See supra discussion accompanying notes 52-55.
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NOV section, 71 would be stricken, 72 and the reference to section7a
504 in section 521 (a) (4), the pattern of violations section,
would also be stricken. 74 Furthermore, turning the situation
around, the reference in section 504(b) to section 521 would be
changed to section 521(b), 75 thus eliminating the apparent inclusion of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) and focusing solely on section 521(b) which contains only the formal assumption of federal
administration of all or part of a state program.
The primary substantive addition limiting the Secretary's authority comes in a new subsection (6) added to section 521(a) of
SMCRA. The bill language for that new subsection specifically
states that:
[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2) of
this subsection, the regulatory authority76 shall have the sole responsibility for issuance of a notice to the permittee or his
agent of a violation of any requirement of this Act or any permit condition required by this Act,77 and the suspension or rev78

ocation of any permit issued pursuant to a State program,
which determination by the State regulatory authority shall be
subject to79 administrative and judicial review in accordance with
state law.

This proposed amendment deals expressly with the congressional
intent or gap basis 80 for the direct NOV regulation. Excepted
subparagraph B is the water quality enforcement provision81 and
excepted paragraph (2) contains the imminent danger or signifi-

71. See supra discussion accompanying notes 3741.
72. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 7(a) (1995).
73. See supra discussion accompanying note 42.
74. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 7(b) (1995).
75. Id. at § 5.
76. Under SMCRA, once a state has achieved primacy, the state or
its agency becomes the regulatory authority. See 30 U.S.C. § 1291(22).
77. This language provides exclusively for State-issued NOVs in primacy states.
78. This language provides for exclusive pattern of violations enforcement in primacy states. See supra discussion at text accompanying
note 42, regarding the Secretary's current authority with reference to
revoking and suspending permits.
79. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 7(c) (1995).
80. See supra discussion accompanying notes 46-50.
81. See infta discussion accompanying notes 91-95.
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cant harm provision allowing the Secretary to issue COs. 82 So, in
effect, the bill provides for exclusive enforcement of an approved
state program by the state except where the imminent danger or
significant harm provision is implicated. Otherwise, the federal
government must formally assume administration of all or part
of the state program.
However, several of the other proposed changes to SMCRA
contained in the bill are drafted so broadly that they seem to
foreclose even paragraph (2) and its imminent danger or significant harm enforcement by the Secretary. Thus, the proposed
amendment to SMCRA section 201(c) would, by implication,
deny the Secretary any authority to investigate, inspect, conduct
hearings, administer oaths, issue subpoenas, compel attendance
of witnesses, require production of written material, review and
approve, vacate or modify orders and decisions, or suspend, revoke, or withhold permits unless in a state without an approved
State program.8 3 The proposed amendment says that "except
where there is an approved State program" the Secretary has authority to engage in the listed activities. Therefore, by implication, where there is an approved State program, the Secretary
does not have the authority to engage in the listed activities.
Surely, however, it is necessary for the Secretary to perform
some of these activities in enforcing the imminent danger or significant harm provision and in formally invoking the authority to
assume administration of a state program where the state has
failed to do so. Additionally, section 517 of SMCRA84 gives the
Secretary authority to inspect to determine that a state is carrying out the approved program. Surely this proposed amendment
language is not intended to repeal that section. House Bill 2372
does not contain any proposed direct amendment to section 517.
Similarly, the proposed amendments to section 503(e) of SMCRA on state programs are drafted so broadly as to appear to require that a state program be amended before there can be enforcement action by the Secretary under the imminent danger or
significant harm provision if the imminent danger or significant
85
harm in question was not prohibited by the state program.
Congress clearly had determined in SMCRA that enforcement in

82.
83.
84.
85.

See 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (2).
H.P, 2372, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
30 U.S.C. § 1267.
See H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
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the face of imminent danger or significant harm should proceed
regardless of the source of the law being violated,8 6 so that such
a change to SMCRA would constitute a fundamental change in
approach. But for this problem, the proposed amendment
merely makes explicit the current scheme of SMCRA, that enforcement of SMCRA by the state during state primacy is of the
state program.8 7 It is the Secretary, and not the state, who can
enforce beyond the scope of the state program if there is imminent danger or significant harm. Because it is unclear what reason would motivate this change; it may be simply an unintentional lack of clarity.
Finally, the bill proposes to amend section 506, which deals
with permits, to treat compliance with a permit as compliance
with the environmental performance standards of SMCRA with
the only exception being that the regulatory authority can revise
the permit.8 8 Permits do not and should not be required to restate SMCRA8 9 although a catch-all permit provision requiring
compliance with SMCRA and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto should satisfy the proposed amendment. Here again,
as with the proposed amendment to section 503(e), the proposed amendment does not appear to give exception to the imminent danger or significant harm situation.
The exception for revising a permit, however, appears limited
in that the proposed amendment refers to revising the permit
pursuant to section 511(c) of SMCRA. 90 This section of SMCRA
suggests the necessity of a pre-established schedule for reviewing
outstanding permits and, if enforced in that manner, would have
limited applicability.

86. Section 521(a)(2) of SMCRA applies whenever "[a]ny condition or practice exist, or ... any permittee is in violation of... this
Chapter which condition, practice, or violation also creates an imminent
danger . . ." (emphasis added). 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (2). Thus, a violation of the Act is only one of several bases for exercise of authority
under this provision.
87. Similarly federal enforcement under section 521(b) of SMCRA
after formal assumption is of the state program until the Secretary substitutes a federal program for the state program. See 30 U.S.C. § 1254,
on federal programs.
88. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 6 (1995).
89. See infra note 109.
90. 30 U.S.C. § 1261(c).
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Unless rewritten, the proposed amendments to sections 201(c),
503(e), and 506 of SMCRA would have to be interpreted more
narrowly than their language suggests in order to make them
consistent with the paragraph (2) exception provided for in the
proposed amendment to section 521(a) and with other extant
provisions of SMCRA for which no express amendments are
proposed.
B.

Enforcement of the Clean Water Act
as Applied to Mining Operations

House Bill 2372 also appears to propose amending the Clean
Water Act of 1977 (CWA) 91 by limiting enforcement of that Act
at any surface mine or reclamation operation to action taken by
"the regulatory authority approved by" the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the CWA. 92 The term "regulatory
authority" is not used in the CWA, 93 so the bill appears to be using that term here in reference to the state delegee of enforcement power for a given CWA program such as the NPDES program.94 However, the EPA clearly has concurrent enforcement
power under the CWA.95 The enforcement scheme provided for
in the CWA simply should not be amended through a provision
in a bill otherwise unrelated to the CWA and which provision
would not have any kind of universal applicability in the CWA
regulatory scheme.

91. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
92. If adopted, House Bill 2372, section 7(c), would amend SMCRA and create section 521 (a) (6) (B) of SMCRA to this end.
93. See, e.g., section 402 of the CWA, establishing the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342.
94. See id. There are several other programs within the CWA that
states may assume administration of, all independently of one another:
33 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (new source performance standards); § 134 4 (g)
(wetlands dredge & fill discharge permit program); and § 1345(c) (sewage sludge disposal permit program).
95. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342(i) (1994). It is appropriate to refer to
the federal government as having primacy at all times. See Robert E.
Beck, Introduction, History, and Overview, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 52.06(b)(2) (Beck ed., 1991).
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C. judicial Review
House Bill 2372 would amend the judicial review provisions of
SMCRA 96 in three respects. The first proposed amendment on judicial review would make an order of an administrative law judge
(ALJ) "in a proceeding conducted pursuant to section 554 of tide 5, United States Code" 97 a final decision of the Secretary
which is subject to judicial review under the SMCRA judicial review section. 9 Section 554 deals with adjudications. 9 In a recent
article1°° describing in detail litigation before the Department of
the Interior, Michael C. Hickey notes the following procedure:
When, however, OSM issues to a coal operator a notice of violation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, . .
• the operator files with the Hearings Division an application
for review of the notice ....

There follows a trial-type proceed-

ing conducted by an ALJ at which both OSM and the operator
may be represented by counsel. Upon issuance by the ALJ of a
decision or order, each party may appeal to IBLA by filing a
notice of appeal with IBLA on or before thirty days from date
of receipt of the ALJ opinion .... 101
So apparently the purpose of this proposed amendment is to cut
off within the Department of the Interior the appeals described
in this excerpt and in other adjudications involving SMCRA.
While the appeal process within the Department of the Interior
may need reform, 1°2 this sort of piecemeal approach is not best
suited to achieving overall reform.
The second proposed amendment would remove a provision
regarding citizen suits. Currently section 526(e) of SMCRA
provides:

96. SMCRA § 526, 30 U.S.C. § 1276 (1994).
97. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994),
deals with adjudications in administrative procedure.
98. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 8(a) (1995).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 554; see also §§ 556 (hearings, etc.), 557 (initial decisions, etc.).
100. Michael C. Hickey, Litigation Before the Department of the Interior,
NAT. RESOuRcES & ENv'T, Summer 1996, at 20.
101. Id at 21.
102. This point was made by Tom Galloway at a roundtable discussion at a recent colloquium on SMCRA. See Roundtable, Colloquium on
SMCRA: A Twenty Year Review, 21 S. ILL. U. LJ. 575, 576 (1997).
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Action of the state regulatory authority pursuant to an approved State program shall be subject to judicial review by a
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with State law,
but the availability of such review shall not be construed to
limit the operation of the rights established in section 520 [the
citizen suit provision] except as provided therein. 10 3
The proposed amendment would strike the second half of this
subsection and place the period after "State law." 1°4 It appears
that this amendment is intended to remove the protection accorded citizen suits01 s when the action of a state regulatory authority is subject to review by a state court of competent jurisdiction. While the federal courts had split over the propriety of
citizen suits for enforcement of SMCRA in federal court after a
state obtained primacy, 106 SMCRA clearly authorizes such oversight actions by the public:
any person . . . may commence a civil action . . . to compel
compliance with this chapter ... (2) against
... the appropriate State regulatory authority to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment ... where there is alleged a
failure of the appropriate State regulatory authority to perform
any act or duty under this Chapter which is not discretionary
with . . . the appropriate State regulatory authority." 107
This quoted language has no meaning unless Congress contemplates citizen suits in federal court after state primacy. There is,
however, no provision in House Bill 2372 to amend this language
in SMCRA section 520(a).
It is doubtful that the mere removal of the protective language
in section 526(e) would be sufficient to accomplish overturning
the public's oversight role otherwise so clearly established in SMCRA. It is obviously important to retain full citizen oversight 0 8

103. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(e) (1994).
104. See H.R 2372, 104th Cong. § 8(b) (1995) (proposing removing the protective language of SMCRA § 526(e)).
105. See 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994).
106. Compare Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 830 F.2d 494 (3d
Cir. 1987) (disallowing citizen suit) with Molinary v. Powell Mountain
Coal Co., 779 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. W. Va. 1991), aff'd 125 F.3d 231 (4th
Cir. 1997) (allowing citizen suit).
107. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 95-218, at 88-91 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 625-27, for the comprehensive and important role
contemplated for citizen participation in the regulatory and enforce-
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particularly as federal budgets shrink requiring that the federal
government shrink its oversight role. 1°9 States do not appear to
be in an expansive budgeting mode either. Thus it is more important than ever that citizen suit provisions remain
comprehensive.
Finally, the third proposed amendment would provide that the
Secretary's formal action to resume administration of all or part
of a state program ° be subject to judicial review in the district
that includes the capital of the state whose program is at issue."'
SMCRA already designates this district as one in which any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a state program
or to promulgate a federal program for a state is subject to review.112 House Bill 2372 makes no effort to correct the current
lack of clarity in the SMCRA judicial review provisions and continues with that lack of clarity in the proposed amendment.
When action that is judicially reviewable is made subject to review in a particular venue, does that mean it is not subject to judicial review anywhere else? If that is what Congress intends, adding the word "only" would clarify that, as Congress did in one
of the judicial review provisions where it said that review could
be "only by the United States District Court for the District in
which the surface coal mining operation is located."113 Congress
made a similar use of "only" in one part of the citizen suit provision where it said the suit could be brought "only in the judicial
district in which the surface coal mining operation complained
of is located."114 In other provisions, however, such as the pro-

posed amendment under discussion here, where "only" is not
ment processes under SMCRA.
109. See infra note 124 as to the federal budget for OSM. Even at
enactment of SMCRA in 1977, the House noted: "The State or Department of Interior can employ only so many inspectors, only a limited
number of inspections can be made on a regular basis and only a limited amount of information can be required in a permit or bond release application or elicited at a hearing." H.R. REP. No. 95-218, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CAN. 593, 625.
110. See supra discussion at text accompanying note 36.
111. H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 8(b) would add section 526(f) to
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(f).
112. See section 526(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1). See
cases cited supra note 32.
113. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (1) (emphasis added).
114. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (emphasis added).
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11 5
used, courts have split on the issue of exclusivity.

D.

The Statute of Limitations

Although related to enforcement during state primacy, but of
more general applicability, House Bill 2372 would enact a statute
of limitations on enforcement,11 6 including collection of penalties, within "three years from the date on which the violation
first occurs."11 7 As applied to the collection of a penalty an alternative might have been, for example, three years from the date
on which the penalty is assessed, or is it intended that "violation"
comprehends failing to pay an assessed penalty? 1 8 Failure to pay
an assessed penalty certainly is itself a violation of SMCRA. When
does the violation of failing to pay an assessed penalty occur; on
the day it is due but not paid? Section 518(c) of SMCRA gives a
party thirty days to pay a proposed penalty in full.119 Or is the
proposed amendment intended to mean that any suits for collecting fines or penalties already imposed have to be brought
within three years of the date the underlying violation that led to
the fine or penalty occurred? The proposed amendment does
not say "underlying violation"; it says "first occurs." Does that
mean the same thing? In 3M Co. v. Browner,1 20 the court said of
"first accrued" as used in the federal general statute of
12 1
limitations:
Since then [1871], the term accrued in § 2462 has been taken
to mean the running of the limitations period in penalty ac122
tions is measured from the date of violation.

115. Compare Commonwealth v. Watt, 741 F2d 37 (4th Cir. 1984),
with Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981).
116. "[F]or the enforcement of any violation, fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise . . . ." H.R. 2372, 104th Cong. § 9
(1995).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725
F2d 1422, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(interpreting the use of "violation" in
SMCRA broadly to encompass the Secretary's failure to perform a
mandatory duty).
119. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c).
120. 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
122. 17 E3d at 1462. A quotation from another case makes it clear
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It is not clear where the three year period comes from; such a
limitation does not exist in either the Clean Air Act or the Clean
Water Act. On the other hand, the general federal statute of limitations that the court said applied to "civil penalty cases brought
before agencies" provides for a period of five years.12
CONCLUSION

Even if House Bill 2372 is not passed and, therefore, does not
result in a cutback of federal supervisory and enforcement efforts under SMCRA, federal budget cuts may well have that effect.1 2A Furthermore, it may be incumbent on OSM to undertake
some new regulatory efforts which, if undertaken, would at minimum involve administrative expenses. Therefore, it is useful to

consider where OSM should cut back and where it should continue its efforts.
This author believes that rather than scaling back OSM enforcement activity in the manner proposed in House Bill 2372,
an alternative focus needs to be considered. Clearly OSM, as explained in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,125
has an interest in accurate and complete data collection and
other administrative details to facilitate OSM's oversight role.
However, it should be secondary to enforcement of environmental standards on the ground. Furthermore, to seek to enforce the
data collection interest through the section 521(a) TDN concept
seems cumbersome and unnecessary. SMCRA section 521 en-

that the court is contemplating " 'the date of the underlying violation'." Id. (quoting United States v. Core Lab., 759 E2d 480, 482 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
123. Id. at 1455-57.
124. Thus appropriations for OSM went down approximately
141/2%, from $110,006,000 (plus bond forfeitures and civil penalties) in
the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 Stat. 2499, 2509 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.; 43 U.S.C.; and 48 U.S.C.), to
$94,172,000 (plus bond forfeitures and civil penalties) in the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-625
(1996).
125. 653 F.2d 514, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 822 (1981). See discussion in Beck, Setting the Course, supra note 8,
at 28.
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forcement procedures should be limited to enforcement of environmental performance standards on site at the mining operation. Section 521 seems indeed to be directed toward this. Thus
one way for OSM to limit its role is to separate enforcement of
environmental performance standards at the mining operation
from other SMCRA requirements and give priority to the former.
In its June 20, 1996 directive on Oversight of State Regulatory
Programs1' OSM states:
Oversight will not be process driven. Instead, OSM oversight
will focus on the on-the-ground/end-result success of the State
program in achieving the purposes of the Act. Also, it will focus
on identifying the need for and providing financial, technical
and other program assistance to States to strengthen their
127
programs.

Clearly this statement represents the appropriate focus for federal oversight. But it should be clear to the states that the ability
of OSM to provide financial assistance will become increasingly
more difficult. Furthermore, some of the major on- the-ground
problems still extant, both in terms of damage caused and remedial costs, stem from pre-SMCRA mining, particularly acid mine
drainage. 128 OSM needs to turn its attention more seriously to
this problem.
While theoretically these pre-SMCRA problems fall within the
scope of the Abandoned Mine Lands Program1 29 under SMCRA,
the money is not there to deal with them.1 30 In the meantime

126. OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT
RECTIVE SYSTEM, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, REG-8 TRANSMITTAL (June

Di-

20,

1996) (implementing OSM/State Title V Oversight Team Report (July
1995)).
127. Id.
128. For an idea of the magnitude of the problem, see Common-

wealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977),
appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977).

129. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243.
130. See § 1232. Abandoned mine reclamation is supported by a
reclamation fee imposed on current mine operations. OSM has estimated cleanup costs related to the acid mine drainage problem at $65

million. See Don Hopey, Money Needed to Clean Streams Polluted by Mine
Drainage, PrITSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 1997, at B-i, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. Professor McGiunley has noted a low
figure of $1.4 billion. See Roundtable, supra note 102, at 587.
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some states are struggling to deal with the problems.131 Problems
with ongoing mining operations could be handled through the
imposition of adequate bonding requirements.1 32 The failure
here is not from lack of oversight, but from lack of putting together a sufficient bonding program from the beginning. Thus
OSM should expend resources in reviewing what is necessary to
address pre-SMCRA needs and in correcting the deficiencies in
the bonding program.
Despite OSM's Directive on Oversight statement emphasizing
ground/end results,133 a December 1996 OSM draft of a directive
on TDNs did not limit its use of the TDN process to violations
on the ground. Instead TDNs are to be issued in three categories
of violations: performance standards, reporting, and permit
deficiencies.1 34
In the provision on violations of performance standards the
draft directive refers to "performance standards or other obligations
imposed on the operator under the approved permit or the approved program" that are observed during the inspection process.135 What are these other obligations? The segment on reporting requires TDNs when "the permittee has failed to submit reports
or other information required under the approved permit."1 3 6 In
the segment on permit deficiencies TDNs would be issued when
"the permit allows a design or practice that is unauthorized
under the approved program" or when the permit "completely
omits required administrative or technical information" or if
there is a failure "to follow a procedure required by the approved program as a prerequisite for permit approval." 37 Thus it
is clear that OSM uses the TDN process beyond dealing with onthe-ground violations. Further consideration needs to be given to
cutting back on the usages that do not deal directly with on-theground enforcement issues.
131. See Barlow Burke, Reclaiming the Law of Suretyship, 21 S. ILL. U.

L.j 449, 460-99 (1997); Roundtable, supra note 102, at 582-84 (remarks
of Tom Galloway).
132. See Burke, supra note 131, at 487-99.
133. See supra text accompanying note 121.
134. Draft INE-35, § 3(b)(1)(a)-(c) (Dec. 1996). A fourth part (d)
deals with inspections based on citizen complaints. Clearly the inspection provision in SMCRA requires a TDN in this latter instance.
135. Id. § 3(b)(1)(a).
136. Id. § 3(b) (1)(b), with one specified exception.
137. Id. § 3(b) (1)(c).

